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Empathy involves affective, cognitive, and emotion regulative components. The affective
component relies on the sharing of emotional states with others and is discussed here
in relation to the human Mirror System. On the other hand, the cognitive component
is related to understanding the mental states of others and draws upon literature
surrounding Theory of Mind (ToM). The final component, emotion regulation, depends
on executive function and is responsible for managing the degree to which explicit
empathic responses are made. This mini-review provides information on how each of
the three components is individually affected by group membership and how this leads
to in-group bias.
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In their Perception-Action Model of empathy, Preston and de
Waal (2002) state that “the attended perception of the object’s
state automatically activates the subject’s representations of the
state, situation, and object, and that activation of these rep-
resentations automatically primes or generates the associated
autonomic and somatic responses, unless inhibited.” Their view
of empathy included various phenomena such as emotional
contagion, cognitive empathy, guilt, and helping which accord-
ing to their model all relied on the perception-action mech-
anism. While typically empathy has been investigated using
behavioral paradigms, more recently it is becoming tangible to
investigate the neural architecture that underlies this process
(Preston and de Waal, 2002; Boston, 2007; Singer and Lamm,
2009; Decety, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Bernhardt and Singer,
2012). Decety (2011) recently proposed a three component basis
for empathic experiences, highlighting affective, cognitive, and
emotion regulative components. These components are deemed
necessary for experiencing empathy where the affective compo-
nent is identified as a bottom-up, or automatic, process and
the cognitive and emotion regulative components are identified
as top-down modulators. That is, sharing the pain of others
occurs automatically but behavioral responses are differentiated
by cognitive factors (for example, perspective taking) and emo-
tion regulative factors (for example, motivation). Social neu-
roscience has also begun investigating the modulating factors
that interfere with empathic responses such as inter-individual
differences (Singer et al., 2004; Hein and Singer, 2008), close-
ness (Beeney et al., 2011), and groups (Ito and Bartholow,
2009; Chiao and Mathur, 2010). Group membership describes
a group of people sharing similar and recognizable character-
istics where an individual can categorize others as belonging
to that particular social group (Abrams, 2012). The focus of
the present review is to identify how group membership affects
each of the three components of empathy and to illustrate
how this accumulates to a biased view of how we see the
world.
AFFECTIVE EMPATHY: THE ABILITY TO SHARE THE
AFFECTIVE STATES OF OTHERS
The main problem in understanding empathy from a neuro-
science perspective is explaining how we can overcome the phys-
ical distance between our brain and that of others. How can
we make sure we experience the same emotions as others and
how can we understand the emotions of others by just observing
their behaviors? Simulation theory suggests that we understand
other people’s actions and emotions by mirroring their actions
and feelings onto our own mind state (Preston and de Waal,
2002; Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2008; Keysers and Gazzola,
2009; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). According to the classical
view, perception-action coupling of motor actions is supported
by mirror neurons located in areas such as the inferior parietal
lobule (IPL) and posterior inferior frontal gyrus (Iacoboni et al.,
1999; Rizzolatti et al., 2001), however, fMRI studies have shown
that additional regions such as superior temporal sulcus (STS),
dorsal and ventral premotor cortex and superior parietal lobule
are also involved in perception-action coupling of motor actions
(Molenberghs et al., 2009, 2010; Caspers et al., 2010).
The human mirror system does not passively respond to the
observation of actions but is influenced by the mindset of the
observer (Molenberghs et al., 2012c). Crucially for this review,
previous studies have shown that group membership can mod-
ulate perception-action coupling. For example, a recent fMRI
study (Molenberghs et al., 2012b) investigated the effect group
membership has on our ability to accurately represent action
perception. Participants were randomly divided into red or blue
teams and they were told they had to compete against a mem-
ber of the other team by pressing a button response as quickly
as possible. In a subsequent experiment, participants were shown
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video clips of either in-group or out-group members making
button-press responses as quickly as possible in a similar com-
petitive situation, where their job was to identify which team
member pressed the button fastest. On average both groups in the
video clips pressed the buttons equally fast but behavioral analy-
sis showed that participants responded that their team members
pressed the button faster. Additional fMRI analyses showed differ-
ential neural activation when presented with actions of in-group
members compared with out-group members. That is, for those
participants who showed an in-group bias behaviorally (those
participants that said their team members were faster), greater
activity in the IPL was shown when observing in-group members
perform the action compared with members from the out-group
(Molenberghs et al., 2012b). The IPL plays an important role in
perception action coupling and its modulation by group mem-
bership suggests we simulate the actions of in-group members
more easily. This is in line with a recent EEG study by Gutsell and
Inzlicht (2010), who found larger EEG mu suppression (which
has previously been associated with mirror neuron activity) when
observing actions of in-group members compared to actions of
out-group members. Interestingly, this effect increased with the
amount of prejudice toward the out-group (Gutsell and Inzlicht,
2010). This reduced perception-action coupling for out-group
members also extends to feelings of empathy. For example in a
TMS study, Avenanti and colleagues (2010) found a reduction in
motor-evoked potential (MEP) amplitude in the hand of partic-
ipants (induced by TMS to the contralateral motor cortex) when
watching an in-group member being painfully stimulated (com-
pared to touch) but no such effect was found when watching
out-group members in pain. This suggests that participants sim-
ulated the pain of the in-group member but not the pain of the
out-group member.
Though predominantly focused on action-perception, vicar-
ious experiences through mirroring have also been shown to
extend to emotion and sensory domains as well (Carr et al., 2003;
Keysers et al., 2004, 2010; Keysers and Fadiga, 2008; Keysers and
Gazzola, 2009). Observing another person’s emotional or sen-
sory state elicits activity in a homologous area in the observer,
supporting the notion that we vicariously experience the emo-
tional and sensory states of others and represent these states onto
our own emotional and sensory repertoires (Keysers and Gazzola,
2009). Indeed a recent meta-analysis including 125 fMRI studies
on the mirror system found that perception-action coupling of
emotional expressions through vicarious experience is not lim-
ited to the aforementioned mirror areas but also involves brain
areas involved in, for example, experiencing pain such as the
insula and cingulate cortex (Molenberghs et al., 2009). The role of
the mirror system in action understanding and affective empathy
is controversial (Saxe, 2005, 2006; Hickok, 2009; Decety, 2010)
but our view here is that vicarious responses are at least par-
tially involved in affective empathy through mirroring processes,
though we acknowledge that they are only part of the story. For
example Decety (2011) views affective empathy more broadly as
just mirroring and his model of affective empathy also includes
affective arousal which he identifies as “the automatic discrimina-
tion of a stimulus as appetitive or aversive, hostile or hospitable,
pleasant or unpleasant, threatening or nurturing.”
Neuropsychological evidence suggests that greater vicarious
empathic responses are elicited from own-ethnicity members
compared with other-ethnicity members (Avenanti et al., 2006,
2010; Ito and Bartholow, 2009; Xu et al., 2009; Chiao andMathur,
2010; Azevedo et al., 2012; Gutsell and Inzlicht, 2012; Sessa et al.,
2013). For example, a recent fMRI study showed that when
observing a member of the same ethnicity experiencing painful
stimulation, greater activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cor-
tex (dACC) and anterior insula (AI) were found compared with
when a member from a different ethnicity was experiencing pain
(Xu et al., 2009). Race, however, is not the only factor to influence
empathic responses to in-groups and out-groups. Group mem-
bership has also been found to moderate activation of the AI
in response to observing painful situations. Hein and Colleagues
(2010) showed in their fMRI study that greater activation in the
left AI was found when in-group members (those from the same
sporting team) received pain compared with out-group mem-
bers (those from another sporting team). This activity was also
found to correlate positively with the willingness to share the pain
with an in-group member compared with an out-group mem-
ber. When and out-group member received pain, rather than
an increase in AI activity, more activity occurred in the right
ventral striatum [an area typically associated with pleasure and
schadenfreude (Singer et al., 2006; Takahashi et al., 2009)], and
this activity was negatively correlated with the willingness to share
the pain of the out-group member (Hein et al., 2010). In a similar
fMRI study, Cikara and colleagues (2011) monitored neural activ-
ity when participants watched video clips of two sporting teams
(participant favorite vs. other) compete against each other. They
found that when the participants’ team won, increased activity
in the ventral striatum was observed. More importantly, though,
when the participants’ team lost, greater activity in the AI and
dACC were shown suggesting that participants were empathizing
with the pain that the players of their favored team felt. However,
sharing the emotions with others alone cannot explain the rich
experience of empathy. Empathy also involves a cognitive and
emotional regulative component.
COGNITIVE EMPATHY OR THE ABILITY TO REASON ABOUT
OTHERS’ MENTAL STATES
Vicariously sharing other people’s emotions helps us partially
understand how other people are feeling, but to completely
understand the beliefs, desires and intentions of others, one
must also reason about the mental state of others. This cognitive
aspect of empathy is typically associated with regions associated
with mental state reasoning or so called Theory of Mind (ToM)
and often involves regions such as the medial Prefrontal Cortex
(mPFC), Temporoparietal Junction (TPJ), and adjacent poste-
rior Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS) (Amodio and Frith, 2006;
Saxe, 2006; Decety and Lamm, 2007; Frith, 2007; Keysers and
Gazzola, 2007; Uddin et al., 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Van
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Cheon et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory,
2011).
Cognitive empathy can also be modulated by group mem-
bership. Adams et al. (2009) used an fMRI modified version
of the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test” (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001) in which participants are presented with pictures
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of just the eyes of people and participants then have to judge
what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. Adams
et al. (2009) used pictures of Asian and Caucasian people
and then let native Japanese and white Americans judge the
mental state of those people. They found a behavioral intra-
cultural advantage for understanding the mental state of in-
group members compared to out-group members and showed
that this in-group bias was associated with increased activity in
the posterior STS. In line with Adams et al. (2009), research
surrounding ToM has consistently shown the importance of
the STS in understanding the mental states of others (Fletcher
et al., 1995; Allison et al., 2000; Gallagher and Frith, 2003;
Amodio and Frith, 2006). Similarly, Cheon et al. (2011) found
that Korean participants showed more empathy for in-group
members experiencing emotional pain than out-group mem-
bers and that this was related to increased activity in the TPJ.
Similar studies have also illustrated the importance of the mPFC
in in-group bias. For example, Mathur and colleagues (2010)
found increased activation in the mPFC when watching in-group
members experience emotional pain compared to out-group
members and this increase predicted greater empathy and altru-
istic motivation for one’s in-group. Another fMRI study found
mPFC activation when participants watched pictures of social
groups but not for extreme low-status groups (Harris and Fiske,
2006).
The mPFC also has an important role in social categoriza-
tion, with increased activation in this region previously associ-
ated with in-group concepts compared to out-group concepts in
both existing (Morrison et al., 2012) and newly created groups
(Molenberghs and Morrison, 2012). Volz and colleagues (2009)
also found that during an fMRI modified version of the mini-
mal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971) high in-group favoritism
was associated with increased activation in the mPFC. Taken
together, the aforementioned findings suggest that increased acti-
vation in cognitive empathy regions are associated with increased
understanding of the mental state of in-group compared to out-
group members (Adams et al., 2009; Mathur et al., 2010; Cheon
et al., 2011), in-group minus out-group social categorization
(Volz et al., 2009; Molenberghs and Morrison, 2012; Morrison
et al., 2012) and in-group favoritism (Volz et al., 2009), suggesting
further the modulating role of group membership on empathic
experiences.
EMOTIONAL SELF-REGULATION OR THE CONTROL OF
EXPLICIT EMOTIONS
To reiterate, affective empathy is partially supported by simulating
the emotional states of others whereas cognitive empathy relies
partially on understanding another’s mental state through cog-
nitive reasoning. Given this capacity to experience the affective
and mental states of others, it seems necessary that an additional
network be set to moderate the degree to which we experience
these effects or explicitly express these states. Without an emo-
tion regulative network, shared emotional states may inhibit our
ability to perform tasks that require emotional distance (e.g., a
surgeon operating on a child or a defense lawyer supporting a
psychopath) or it may interfere with our ability to hide automatic
biases (e.g., a parent being derogative to a teacher of a different
racial background). Essentially, there needs to be a neural func-
tion that inhibits or facilitates empathic responses more explicitly
to allow for appropriate functioning in day-to-day life (Decety,
2011). Areas involved with emotion regulation such as the rostral
anterior cingulate cortex (rACC), dorsolateral (dlPFC) and ven-
tromedial (vmPFC) prefrontal cortex have previously been shown
to modulate the effects of empathy (Amodio et al., 2006, 2008;
Cheng et al., 2007; Beer et al., 2008; Ito and Bartholow, 2009;
Decety et al., 2010; Decety, 2011).
For example, Cheng and colleagues (2007) investigated the
neural processes underlying expert and naïve populations’ reac-
tions to a person experiencing painful (penetrated with acupunc-
ture needles) and non-painful (Q-tip) stimulation. Evidence
from their fMRI investigation revealed increased activity for
the pain matrix network (dACC, insula, somatosensory cortex)
in naïve participants. On the other hand, the experts (physi-
cians with acupuncture experience) provided no activity in these
areas, instead neural activity was recorded in vmPFC which is
involved in emotion regulation (Decety, 2011) and TPJ which
has previously been implicated in self-other differentiation and
ToM (Decety and Lamm, 2007). These results suggest that the
acupuncturists could influence their vicarious pain experience by
down-regulating these responses through emotional regulation
and increased self-other differentiation. Using a similar paradigm,
Decety et al. (2010) used EEG to identify the time course of
empathic responses and the regulation thereof. The authors iden-
tified that for naïve participants, early (N110) and late (P3)
activity showed differential responses for painful and non-painful
stimuli but when the experienced physicians viewed this stimulus
set, there were no differences in early or late processes which sug-
gests that emotion regulation can impede on early processing of
painful stimulus presentation (Decety et al., 2010).
Relevant to emotion regulation is the ability to inhibit explicit
emotional reactions. It is important to regulate explicit emo-
tional expressions to maintain egalitarian status within society.
An example of this was shown in an fMRI study by Richeson
and colleagues (2003) who argued that people (especially those
with high racial bias) during interracial contact must inhibit
racial attitudes and this would result in depletion of executive
functions (i.e., response inhibition) which in turn would lead
to impaired performance on a subsequent task that requires
these functions. They tested this hypothesis by measuring White
participants internal beliefs toward racial groups (Blacks and
Whites) using an Implicit Association Test (IAT). Additionally,
they asked participants to comment on a few questions with a
Black Experimenter (mixed-race interaction) and then partici-
pants completed a Stroop task to measure executive functioning
(task inhibition). Results showed that those who scored higher on
the IAT for racial bias, also showed more interference effects on
the subsequent Stroop task. When followed up with an fMRI task
where participants were presented with Black and White faces,
they found increased activation in the ACC and the dlPFC when
Black faces were presented, suggesting greater response inhibi-
tion during these trials. A significant positive relationship was also
found between the increase in ACC and dlPFC activation and the
IAT and Stroop task, where this increase in the right dlPFC medi-
ated the effect between IAT and Stroop interference. Collating
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this evidence, it suggests that people who show higher interracial
bias try to inhibit automatic stereotypes, ultimately leading to a
reduction in cognitive resources.
Another nice example of emotion regulation was shown in
an fMRI study by Cunningham and colleagues (2004). They
showed White participants pictures of Black (out-group) and
White (in-group) faces either very briefly (30ms) or for a longer
duration (525ms). The authors predicted that when these pic-
tures would be presented very briefly, participants would not have
enough time to regulate their emotions (i.e., negative responses
to the Black faces). The fMRI results showed there was increased
activation in the amygdala for Black faces compared to White
faces when the stimuli were presented very briefly but no such
effect was found when the stimuli were presented for longer.
Instead they found increased activation in the dlPFC and ACC
in the long stimulus presentation condition. When correlating
the scores of an IAT regarding race bias with that of neural
activity, a positive relationship was shown between behavioral
data and fMRI activity in the amygdala for Black and White
faces. Similarly, Black-White differences in amygdala activity
between the short and long image presentations were predicted
by frontal activation. Taking these findings together, it suggests
that an automatic race bias against Black faces in White par-
ticipants is moderated using reflective cognitive processes that
only take effect after a period of time. Given that it is not
socially acceptable to show explicit in-group bias, the authors
interpreted this effect as increased emotion regulation of an
automatic bias.
However, social categorization can also override automatic
biases. For example, Van Bavel et al. (2008) investigated whether
arbitrary and temporary novel group membership could override
the effects of predominant group memberships within society
(i.e., race as described in their study). Therefore, they randomly
assigned participants to a mixed-race team. Pairing behavioral
paradigms with functional MRI, the authors measured activity in
the fusiform face area (FFA), which has previously been shown to
be modulated by face perception and visual expertise (Gauthier
et al., 1999, 2000; Golby et al., 2001; Van Bavel et al., 2011), when
participants were presented with pictures of faces of in-group
and out-group members. The results revealed greater activity in
bilateral FFA for in-group faces compared to out-group faces.
Interestingly this effect was specific to in-group vs. out-group and
was not modulated by race (see also Van Bavel and Cunningham,
2009 and Van Bavel et al., 2011 for similar results). This provides
evidence that categorizing people from a different race into an
in-group can inhibit automatic racial biases.
CONCLUSION
The current review aimed to highlight how group membership
modulates the affective, cognitive, and regulative components
of empathy. We have shown that in-group bias is not only a
result of increased vicarious simulation of the actions (Gutsell
and Inzlicht, 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2012b) and feelings (Xu
et al., 2009) of in-group compared to out-group members but
also follows from increased activation in ToM regions (Adams
et al., 2009; Mathur et al., 2010; Cheon et al., 2011) when trying to
understand the mental state of in-group vs. out-group members.
These group biases can be influenced by emotional regulation
(Ito and Bartholow, 2009) depending on expertise (Cheng et al.,
2007; Decety et al., 2010) and context (Richeson and Shelton,
2003; Cunningham et al., 2004) so that we respond in a socially
acceptable way to our environment. Lastly, it seems that arbi-
trary re-categorization can override automatic biases such as race
(Van Bavel et al., 2008). Seeing as group membership modulates
responses at each component of empathy, future investigations
should identify methods of reversing these biases at each of the
three distinguishable levels.
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